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Abstract 
The reported work points at developing a practical approach for power transmission planners 
to secure power networks from potential deliberate attacks. We study the interaction between 
a system planner (defender) and a rational attacker who threatens the operation of power 
grid. In addition to the commonly used hardening strategy for protecting the network, a new 
sort of resources is introduced under the deception concept. Feint and deception are 
acknowledged as effective tools for misleading the attacker in strategic planning. To this end, 
the defender deception is mathematically formulated by releasing misinformation about his 
plan in the shared cognition-based model. To reduce the risk of damage in case of deception 
failure, preemptive-goal programming is utilized to prioritize the hardening strategy for the 
vital components. Furthermore, the “value of posturing” is introduced which is the benefits 
that the deception brings to the system. The problems are formulated as tri-level mixed-
integer linear programming and solved by constraint-and-column generation method. 
Comprehensive simulation studies performed on WSCC 9-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems 
indicate how the defender will save significant cost from protecting his network with 
posturing rather than hardening and the proposed approach is a promising development to 
ensure the secure operation of power networks. 
 
Keywords: Deception, hardening, malicious attacks, posturing, security, Power system 
planning, preemptive programming, shared cognition, tri-level programming, vulnerability 
analysis. 
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Nomenclature 
Indices and sets: 𝑖 Bus index; 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵. 𝑔 Generator index; 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺. 𝑖𝑗 Transmission line index; (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿. 𝐵 Set of indices of buses. 𝐺 Set of indices of generators. 𝐿 Set of indices of transmission lines. 𝐺𝑏𝑖 Set of indices of generators connected to bus 𝑖. 
Continues Variables: 𝑃𝑔𝐺 The power output of generator 𝑔. 𝑃𝑖𝑆ℎ Load shedding at bus 𝑖. 𝜃𝑖 Voltage angle on bus 𝑖. 𝐹𝑖𝑗 Power flow through line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗). 
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Integer variables: 𝑤𝑔𝐷 Units of capacity 𝑞𝑔 added to generator 𝑔. 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷 Units of capacity 𝑐𝑖𝑗 added to the transmission line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗). 
Binary variables: 𝑥𝑖𝐷 1 if bus 𝑖 is protected and 0 otherwise. 𝑧𝑔𝐷 1 if generator 𝑔 is protected and 0 otherwise. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷 1 if transmission line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗) is protected and 0 otherwise. 𝑥𝑖𝑓  1 if the defender generates false data on protection status 𝑥𝑖𝐷 and 0 otherwise. 𝑧𝑔𝑓  1 if the defender generates false data on protection status 𝑧𝑔𝐷 and 0 otherwise. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓  1 if the defender generates false data on protection status 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷 and 0 otherwise. 𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑓  The protection status of 𝑥𝑖𝐷 observed by the attacker. 𝑧𝑔𝐷𝑓  The protection status of 𝑧𝑔𝐷  observed by the attacker. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑓  The protection status of 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷 observed by the attacker. 𝑥𝑖𝐴 1 if bus 𝑖 is attacked and 0 otherwise. 𝑧𝑔𝐴 1 if generator 𝑔 is attacked and 0 otherwise. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴 1 if transmission line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗) is attacked and 0 otherwise. 
Parameters: 𝑃𝑖𝐷 Summation of loads connected to bus 𝑖. 𝐶𝑖𝑆ℎ Load-shedding cost at bus 𝑖. 𝐵𝑖𝑗 Susceptance for transmission line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗). 𝐹𝑖𝑗 Maximum capacity of transmission line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗). 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Size of capacity increments that can be added to transmission line ሺ𝑖, 𝑗). 𝐶𝑔 The production cost of generating unit 𝑔. 𝑞𝑔 Size of unit increments that can be added to generator 𝑔. 𝑃𝑔𝐺 Maximum generation capacity of generator 𝑔. 𝑅𝑃𝐵 Number of defender’s resource for protecting buses. 𝑅𝑃𝐺 Number of defender’s resource for protecting generators. 𝑅𝑃𝐿 Number of defender’s resource for protecting transmission lines. 𝑅𝑅𝐿 Defender’s resource for the maximum capacity of transmission line reinforcement. 𝑅𝑅𝐺 Defender’s resource in terms of the maximum capacity of generators reinforcement. 𝑅𝐹𝐵 Number of defender’s resource for generating false data on protection status of buses 𝑅𝐹𝐺 Number of defender’s resource for generating false data on protection status of generators. 𝑅𝐹𝐿 Number of defender’s resource for generating false data on protection status of lines. 𝑅𝐴𝐵 Number of attacker’s resource for simultaneously attacking to buses. 𝑅𝐴𝐺 Number of attacker’s resource for simultaneously attacking to generators. 𝑅𝐴𝐿 Number of attacker’s resource for simultaneously attacking to transmission lines. 
 
1. Introduction 
The electric power grid is recognized as one of the most sophisticated systems made by 
humanity, and its importance is acknowledged when there is a threat or a costly power 
outage. As a recent example, a crafted incident involved a sophisticated sniper attack on a 
substation in Metcalf, California in April 2013. Due to this attack, the substation was down 
for almost a month, and the cost of the damage was estimated to be $15.4 million [1]. 
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, from 2011 to 2014, the national 
power grid came under physical or cyber attack once every four days [2]. Due to this growing 
cyber-physical threat against power network, beefing up the power grid resilience is an 
essence. This paper provides a novel defensive scheme to protect the most vital elements in 
the power system against malicious attacks. To this end, the defender’s deception under the 
shared cognition concept [3] is introduced, and the monetary worth of the misleading the 
attacker is calculated. 
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The conventional approach to address the planning against deliberate attack is to 
establish a sequential game among defender and the attacker. This can be formulated as the 
bi-level attacker-defender (AD) or tri-level defender-attacker-defender (DAD) Stackelberg 
game. Reference [4] proposed a comprehensive AD approach to identify critical system 
components, and the solution obtained by a heuristic algorithm where the optimality is 
uncertain. In [5], the same authors proposed the “Global Benders Decomposition” algorithm 
to replace the heuristic approach. However, discontinuity of sub-problem may lead to an 
inaccurate solution. As a more classical solution approach references [6, 7] applied, 
respectively, the strong duality theorem and first-order optimality conditions known as 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to transform the bi-level AD model into a one-level 
problem and implemented the mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) solvers. 
Yao et al. [8] was the pioneer of applying tri-level modeling approach to develop the 
DAD model in power system, where the solution achieved by a decomposition-based method. 
Romero et al. [9], introduced a comprehensive tri-level mixed-integer non-linear model and 
utilized the heuristic approach as the solution strategy. In the modest model, Wu et al. [10], 
proposed a tri-level model and applied an instance of Bender’s decomposition technique using 
primal cuts to achieve a more effective result. Xiang et al. [11] proposed the tri-level DAD 
model and the solution obtained by the robust optimization approach. The attacker's damage 
is quantified by the load curtailment in [12], where the risk optimization method utilized to 
minimize the disruption's consequence. Mitigating the impact of cyber-physical attack 
discussed in [13], and the authors examine the consequence of interrupting the transmission 
lines or generators in addition to load redistribution attacks. 
Hardening refers to the protection status of an element that makes the component 
invulnerable to damage and considered as the commonly used approach for protecting the 
critical assets in resilience improvement and interdiction problems in power networks. Lin et 
al. [14] proposed attack-resilient planning for the distribution networks through a tri-level 
DAD interdiction problem which allocates the hardening resources among the system 
components where the reconfiguration and DG islanding are considered. The hardening 
concept is adopted to equip the distribution networks against the natural hazards in [15, 16], 
where the hardened components help the distribution system to maintain the minimum load 
shed when tolerating the extreme events. The hardening measures are utilized to facilitate 
the restoration process in distribution networks after the damage occurred [17, 18]. This 
achieved by protecting the key equipment in the grid when the system planner has limited 
resources for hardening. Improving the bulk power system resilience against physical attack 
is pursed in [19, 20], where the authors formulated the optimization problem to locate the 
hardening strategies for the most vulnerable component. 
Going beyond the conventional approach in the literature, the shared cognition-based 
model implies soft factors in the mathematical formulation, which explains the role of 
information in the team and organizational performance [21]. One aspect of shared cognition 
is the defender’s deception, which is the actions executed to mislead the adversary 
deliberately. It creates uncertainty and confusion against the adversary’s efforts to found 
situational awareness and to effect and misdirect adversary perceptions and decision processes. 
Aside from outright fortification, disseminating false information for protecting the network 
is a positive strategy [22], where the feint and deception have become the commonly used 
tactic in conflicts [23]. For example, the company can consider when he is in the lack of 
hardening resources, whereby at least it can deceive the attacker into attacking less essential 
facilities. However, how many facilities need hardening, and how much false information is 
required to generate? Another common example is the police car, where you can find some 
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parked police car without any cops in them. They are used for posturing and improving 
security. But how police station should allocate their limited cars to maximize the security? 
Deliberate deception indicates strategic efforts strived at misleading opponents from the 
actual strategic plan of the defender. The degree and type of deception may differ from the 
simple masking of trivial data to outright lies and propagating disinformation. Crawford et 
al. [24] emphasized the importance of lying for strategic benefit about planned tactics and 
proposed a game-theoretic approach to misdirect the enemies. Zhuang et al. [25] developed a 
model to explore the effectiveness of the deception strategy in disclosing the planned decisions. 
The same authors developed the signaling game under the information secrecy and deception 
in [26], where the defender could keep his strategy secrete or mislead the attacker. This type 
of problem can also be viewed as the case that the attacker is not strategic or rational enough 
[27]. The advantage of secrecy and feint from the Homeland-Security point of view is 
discussed in [28], where the authors conclude that the deception and secrecy about data 
disclosure is an advantageous strategy for a planner to increase the effectiveness of defensive 
tactics. Following the same concept of the literature mentioned above, Ma et al. [29] adopted 
the deception as a defensive strategy and assumed that the defender could mislead the 
attacker into using incorrect cost functions that quantify the damage of load shedding. In 
spite of a wealth of research on utilizing deception and secrecy on homeland security and 
critical infrastructure security enhancements, but it is hard to find the example of such 
strategies since these tactics are often classified [28]. While the reviewed works developed 
some game-theoretic approaches to analyzing the deception effectiveness on the planned 
strategies, their method neither promises a resource allocation-based approach to distribute 
the limited deception resource among the component nor determines the facilities deserved 
for the posturing strategy. 
In this paper, a new approach for deception modeling is introduced, and the proposed 
method is appropriated in a resource allocation-based DAD model to find the best posturing 
strategies on the protection status of the equipment. To avoid the risk of deception failure, 
a preemptive goal programming method is employed to prioritize the hardening resources to 
the vital components. It is also essential to estimate the value of the hardening as well as 
that associated with deception strategy; representing new findings not reported in the 
literature. The cost savings provide the valuation of our model. By experimenting with the 
number of hardened facilities and deceptions, the defender can see how many of such 
resources are required to deviate the attacker from the most critical assets. Calculating the 
amount of savings in dollars is of great importance to governments and companies who can 
now adopt judicious, cost-effective steps to prevent malicious attacks based on their valuation. 
The prominent contributions and novelty of the present work are outlined in the ensuing 
parts: 1) providing the mathematical programming approach for posturing and deception in 
terms of shared cognition paradigm; 2) developing a resource allocation-based DAD model 
to find the best feint strategy; 3) quantifying the value of deception in a game-theoretic 
context; 4) employing the preemptive goal programming approach to distinguish between 
hardening/reinforcement and posturing strategies to adopt the effective defense for the vital 
components. The rest of this paper is organized as follow: problem formulation is discussed 
in Section 2 followed by the solution strategy in Section 3. Extensive simulations elucidate 
the efficacy of the proposed technique on different test systems in Section 4. The paper is 
concluded with discussions of opportunities for extensions of the proposed work in Section 5. 
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2. Model Formulation 
The DAD interdiction problem including defender’s deception is formulated as a tri-level 
optimization problem in this section. In the first level, the defender seeks to minimize System 
Operating Cost (𝑆𝑂𝐶) in addition to the required investment resources including hardening 
resources (𝐻𝑅), reinforcement resources (𝑅𝑅), and deception resources (𝐷𝑅) by allocating 
the limited resources to harden/reinforcement the grid’s elements or propagating false 
information about hardening strategies. Note that hardening refers to a protection status 
that makes element protected against attack, and grid’s elements are referred to the buses 
(substations), generators and transmission lines (power transformers also considered as the 
transmission lines) throughout this paper. The full knowledge of defender’s decisions, which 
may include false information, is then passed to the second-level attacker problem who seeks 
to maximize 𝑆𝑂𝐶 by damaging the power network elements considering his limited budget. 
In the third level, the operator evaluates how the defender and attacker strategies influence 
the system operation. This process can be formulated by three hierarchical dependent 
optimization problems, where the formulation is discussed in the next sub-sections. 
2.1 Deception Modelling 
We provide the defender with an option to mislead the rivals about his plans. The 
importance of the deception strategy motivates the researchers in different fields of study to 
develop its formulation. Utilizing asymmetric information in the game-theoretic environment 
[24-29], using probabilistic approach [30, 31], graph theory [30], cosine similarity of binary 
variables [32], and incorrect cost function [29] are among the reported efforts to model the 
deception strategy. Considering the importance of feint strategy in the decision-making 
process, the works mentioned above try to model the deception and simulate the reaction of 
the opponent to the false data. In this paper, we introduce a novel formulation for deception 
and releasing disinformation based on the Boolean logic that enables the posturing strategy 
to be used in the resource allocation problem. Assume 𝜋𝐷 represents the real strategy made 
by the defender (𝜋𝐷 = 1 hardened, 𝜋𝐷 = 0 not hardened element), and 𝜋𝐷𝑓  is the strategies 
data disseminated to the attacker, where 𝜋𝐷𝑓 = 1 means the posturing strategy should be 
taken for the component. We define another variable 𝜋𝑓  to express the defender's effort for 
generating the false information. Fig.1(a) enumerates the possible defender's strategy for data 
propagation. For example, the first row stands for the situation that the defender generates 
false information (𝜋𝑓 = 1) on the status of the hardened facility (𝜋𝐷 = 1), and the attacker 
will be informed that the facility is not defended (𝜋𝐷𝑓 = 0). In the second row, however, 𝜋𝑓 = 0 and the real information will be passed to the attacker (𝜋𝐷𝑓 = 𝜋𝐷). One can consider 
Fig.1(a) as an XOR operator depicted in Fig.1(b) which 𝜋𝐷 and 𝜋𝑓are the inputs and 𝜋𝐷𝑓  is 
the output. Accordingly, the algebraic expression of Fig.1 is presented in (1). 
 
𝝅𝑫
𝝅𝒇 𝝅𝑫𝒇
 𝝅𝑫 𝝅𝒇  𝝅𝑫𝒇  
1 1 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
0 0 0 
(a) (b)  
Figure 1.  (a) Binary representation of defender posturing. (b) XOR operator. 
 𝜋𝐷𝑓 = (𝜋𝑓 + 𝜋𝐷) − 2𝜋𝑓𝜋𝐷 (1) 
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The above formulation paws the way for the defender to decide where the limited deceptive 
efforts should be allocated to have the maximum advantage in strategic planning. 
2.2 Shared Cognition Based Defender- Attacker- Operator Problem: Formulation 
The defender appropriates the available cyber-physical resources in two primary folds: 
physical resources and cyber resources. In physical resources, the defender distributes the 
hardening budget to secure the grid's elements based on the standard, e.g. NERC Physical 
Security CIP-014-2 [33]. In cyber resources, the defender employs the hardening for system 
protection such as protective hardware and software with an emphasis on prioritizing critical 
assets for protection, secure and harden configurations of power networks, and continuously 
assess for remediating vulnerabilities. Consequently, the defender needs to reinforce the 
physical and cyber resources to meet the required resilience level in the power grid. In the 
context of an entire economy, the resources mentioned above must be prioritized and 
allocated within the system to comply with the system security. Accordingly, the defender 
should emphasize to reduce 𝑆𝑂𝐶 (2) and give the priority for allocation the 𝐻𝑅 (2) and 𝑅𝑅 
(5) for the curtail network components, and 𝐷𝑅 (2) for the parts with lower importance. 
While the objective function (6) is a combination of different goals (2)-(5), the preemptive 
goal programming, discussed in subsection 3.2, will be employed to priorities the defender’s 
goals. 
  𝑆𝑂𝐶 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑖𝑆ℎ𝑖∈𝐵 + ∑ 𝐶𝑔𝑃𝑔𝐺𝑔∈𝐺  (2) 𝐻𝑅 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑖∈𝐵 + ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 + ∑ 𝑧𝑔𝐷𝑔∈𝐺  (3) 𝑅𝑅 = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 + ∑ 𝑤𝑔𝐷𝑔∈𝐺  (4) 𝐷𝑅 = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑖∈𝐵 + ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 + ∑ 𝑧𝑔
𝑓
𝑔∈𝐺
 (5) 
 
The system operating cost (2) consists of the total power generation and total load shed 
cost. In general, the generation cost can be expressed by the quadratic function 12 𝑎𝑔𝑃𝑔2 +𝐶𝑔𝑃𝑔 + 𝑏𝑔. The marginal cost of generation unit 𝑔 could be calculated by 𝑚𝑐𝑔(𝑃𝑔) = 𝑐𝑔(𝑃𝑔) =𝑎𝑔𝑃𝑔 + 𝐶𝑔. In practice, 𝑎௚ is a very small number, therefore, the marginal cost could be 
presented by 𝑚𝑐𝑔(𝑃𝑔) = 𝐶𝑔 by ignoring the first term in the marginal cost function. 𝐶𝑖𝑠ℎ is 
the cost that shedding 1MW imposes on the system. Since load shed is not desired in our 
network, we consider a large value for it to act as a penalty in the objective function. Note 
that  𝐶𝑖𝑠ℎ must be pretty much larger than the largest marginal generation cost of a unit in 
the system. The Hardening resources (3) is the total utilized resources for hardening. The 
reinforcement resources (4) is the total spent reinforcement resources in the network, and the 
deception resources (5) is the total number of deceptive efforts that the defender adopted to 
secure his network. All these equations are positive, and the optimization problem tries to 
minimize each individual equation (2)-(5) to reach the lower value for the objective function 
(6). Note that all objective functions (2)– (5) are established based on the concept of resource 
allocation. In the context of operational research, a typical allocation problem involves the 
distribution of resources (e.g., generation dispatch, hardening, reinforcement, and deceptive 
resources in our model) among competing alternatives in order to minimize total costs. Such 
problems have the following components: a set of resources available in given amounts (e.g., 
minimum and maximum capacity of resources); a set of jobs to be done (e.g., enabling or 
disabling status of attacker/defender, load serving, and power conservation at each bus), 
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each consuming a specified amount of resources; and a set of costs or returns for each job 
and resource. 
Problem (6)-(22) has the tri-level structure, where the defender problem(7)-(12) is on the 
upper-level, the attacker problem (13)-(22) located at the middle-level, and the lower-level 
problem (17)-(22) is associated to the operator. Defender problem tries to minimize the cost 
function (6) with respect to the variables in set 𝛥𝒟 = {𝑥𝐷, 𝑦𝐷, 𝑧𝐷, 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷, 𝑤𝑔𝐷, 𝑥𝑓,𝑦𝑓 , 𝑧𝑓 , 𝑥𝐷𝑓, 𝑦𝐷𝑓, 𝑧𝐷𝑓}. Equations (7)-(9) are modelling deception based on (1). Constraint (10) 
bounds the defender’s resources for releasing false information. Similarly, (11) are the 
restrictions for the components’ hardening, and constraints (12) are the limits on transmission 
lines and generators capacity increment. The attacker problem, which is in contrast to the 
defender problem, seeks to maximize cost function (6) with the decision variables in set 𝛥𝒜 ={𝑥𝐴, 𝑦𝐴, 𝑧𝐴}. Constraints (13)-(15) prohibit attacking to the defended elements. Note that in 
light of shared cognition approach, the defender can protect his assets by posturing rather 
than real protection. For instance, the defender may decide to use deception on the protection 
status of bus 𝑖, which is unprotected, i.e., 𝑥𝑖𝐷 = 0. According to (7), when the defender sets 𝑥𝑖𝑓 = 1 and uses a resource to make false information on the protection status of bus 𝑖, the 
transferred data to the attacker is 𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑓 = 1, that means the defender misleads the attacker 
on protection status of 𝑥𝑖. Then the deceived aggressor who received misinformation will not 
attack that bus due to the constraint (13). Constraints (16) limit the opponent's sources for 
striking the network component.  
The last level operator problem which has the optimization variables in set 𝛥𝒪 ={𝑃𝐺, 𝑃𝑆ℎ, 𝜃, 𝐹} evaluates both the attacker and defender tactics. Constraints (17) resembles 
the real part of the line power flow. Constraint (18) is the active power balance in each bus. 
Constraints (19) limit the permissible load-shedding to the amount of load. Constraint (20) 
is the power generator restriction. Constraint (21) limits the active power carried by the 
transmission lines. A transmission line is working with its full capacity, which is its 
fundamental capacity in addition to the capacity supplemented by the planner or is not 
functional because of damage to its own, or its two-ended buses as stated by equation (22). 
Moreover, with 𝐹𝑖𝑗 as the line capacity, we can provide the desired flexibility by considering 
the maximum line capacity, or merely a percentage of the full capacity by introducing a 
factor to go along with the capacity. The dual variables corresponding to the operator 
problem’s constraint are presented after a colon.  
 min𝛥𝒟  max𝛥𝒜  min 𝛥𝒪 (𝑆𝑂𝐶 + 𝐻𝑅 + 𝐷𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅) (6) 
subject to  
𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑓 = (𝑥𝑖𝑓 + 𝑥𝑖𝐷) − 2𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑥𝑖𝐷;   ∀𝑖 (7) 
𝑧𝑔𝐷𝑓 = (𝑧𝑔𝑓 + 𝑧𝑔𝐷) − 2𝑧𝑔𝑓𝑧𝑔𝐷;    ∀𝑔 (8) 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑓 = (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷) − 2𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷;   ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (9) 
∑𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑖∈𝐵 ≤ 𝑅𝐹𝐵; ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑓
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿
≤ 𝑅𝐹𝐿; ∑ 𝑧𝑔𝑓𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝐹𝐺  (10) ∑𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑖∈𝐵 ≤ 𝑅𝑃𝐵; ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ≤ 𝑅
𝑃𝐿; ∑ 𝑧𝑔𝐷𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝑃𝐺 (11) ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐿; ∑ 𝑤𝑔𝐷𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐺 (12) 
 subject to  
 𝑥𝑖𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑓;  ∀𝑖 (13) 
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 𝑧𝑔𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑧𝑔𝐷𝑓;  ∀𝑔  (14) 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑓;  ∀(𝑖, 𝑗)  (15) 
 ∑𝑥𝑖𝐴𝑖∈𝐵 ≤ 𝑅𝐴𝐵; ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ≤ 𝑅
𝐴𝐿; ∑ 𝑧𝑔𝐴𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝐴𝐺 (16) 
  subject to  
  𝐹𝑖𝑗 = 𝐵𝑖𝑗. (𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑗). 𝑈𝑖𝑗. (1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑗 ) ; ∀(𝑖, 𝑗)  ∶  (𝜆𝑖𝑗𝐹 ) (17) 
  ( ∑ 𝑃𝑔𝐺𝑔∈𝐺𝑏𝑖  − ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑗(𝑖,𝑗)∈ 𝐿 + ∑ 𝐹𝑗𝑖(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ) = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 − 𝑃𝑖𝑆ℎ;  ∀𝑖 ∶  (𝜆𝑖𝐵) (18) 
  0 ≤ 𝑃𝑖𝑆ℎ ≤ 𝑃𝑖𝐷;  ∀𝑖 ∶  (𝜇𝑖𝐷) (19) 
  0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔𝐺 ≤ (𝑃𝑔𝐺 + 𝑞𝑔𝑤𝑔𝐷). (1 − 𝑧𝑔𝐴); ∀𝑔 ∶ (𝜇𝑔𝐺) (20) 
  ∣𝐹𝑖𝑗∣ ≤ (𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷). 𝑈𝑖𝑗 ; ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∶ (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 , 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 ) (21) 
  𝑈𝑖𝑗 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖𝐴(1 − 𝑥𝑖𝐷)) . (1 − 𝑥𝑗𝐴(1 − 𝑥𝑗𝐷)) . (1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷)) ; ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (22) 
3. Solution Strategy 
The multi-level format of the proposed approach in the foregoing section renders an NP-
hard problem which is sophisticated to solve [9, 34], and the constraint-and-column 
generation (C&CG) method or a variant of Benders decomposition approach are usually 
employed to find the solution [35, 36]. In Bender’s decomposition approach, the objective 
function of the so-called master problem is progressively constructed based on the dual 
information of the so-called sub-problem. Rather than using the dual information, the C&CG 
approach produces a set of primality cuts in each iteration that requires just primal variables. 
Since the continuous and differentiable sub-problem is not essential in the C&CG approach, 
and generally C&CG performs computationally better than its Benders’ counterpart [36], the 
solution strategy is pursued by the C&CG method in this paper. The first step in solution 
strategy is decomposing the tri-level defender-attacker-operator problem into a master 
problem and a sub-problem. Since the operator is evaluating the defender and attacker 
strategies, we can form the master problem as the defender-operator (min-min), and the sub-
problem as the attacker-operator (max-min) problems. The master problem has the min-min 
format that promises a single-level minimization problem, while the max-min sub-problem 
has the bi-level structure, that needs to be converted to the single-level one either through 
the KKT conditions or strong duality theorem. Note that our proposed formulas allow the 
transformation of the bi-level into the single level one because the operator problem is linear 
and thus convex on its decision variables. The overall procedure for the solution strategy, 
including the interactions among the sub-problems and master problem is schematically 
demonstrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  The procedure of the solution strategy 
3.1 Master Problem 
Master problem (24)-(36) is a minimization programming produced by the combination 
of defender and operator problems. The C&CG technique requires adding an iteration index  𝑣  (where 𝑣 = 1,… , 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) to the optimization variables to facilate appending the new 
optimality cuts in each iteration. 
 min𝛥ℳ  𝜂 (23) 
subject to  
𝜂 ≥ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑣 + 𝐻𝑅𝑣 + 𝐷𝑅𝑣 + 𝑅𝑅𝑣 (24) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷𝑓 = (𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝑓 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷 ) − 2𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝑓 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷 ;   ∀𝑖 (25) 
𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐷𝑓 = (𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝑓 + 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐷 ) − 2𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝑓 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐷 ;    ∀𝑔 (26) 
𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷𝑓 = (𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝑓 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷 ) − 2𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷 ;   ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (27) 
∑𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝑓𝑖∈𝐵 ≤ 𝑅𝐹𝐵; ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣
𝑓
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿
≤ 𝑅𝐹𝐿; ∑ 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝑓𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝐹𝐺   (28) 
∑𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷𝑖∈𝐵 ≤ 𝑅𝑃𝐵; ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ≤ 𝑅
𝑃𝐿 ; ∑ 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐷𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝑃𝐺  (29) ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐿; ∑ 𝑤𝑔,𝑣𝐷𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐺 (30) 
𝐹𝑖𝑗,𝑣 = 𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝜃𝑖,𝑣 − 𝜃𝑗,𝑣)𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑣.(1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑗 ) ;∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (31) 
( ∑ 𝑃𝑔,𝑣𝐺𝑔∈𝐺𝑏𝑖  − ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑗,𝑣(𝑖,𝑗)∈ 𝐿 + ∑ 𝐹𝑗𝑖,𝑣(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑣
𝐷 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑣𝑆ℎ;  ∀𝑖  (32) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑖,𝑣𝑆ℎ ≤ 𝑃𝑖𝐷;  ∀𝑖 (33) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑔,𝑣𝐺 ≤ (𝑃𝑔,𝑣𝐺 + 𝑞𝑔𝑤𝑔,𝑣𝐷 )(1 − 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐴,∗); ∀𝑔 (34) 
∣𝐹𝑖𝑗,𝑣∣ ≤ (𝐹𝑖𝑗,𝑣 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷 ). 𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑣;  ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (35) 
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𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑣 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐴,∗(1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷 )) . (1 − 𝑥𝑗,𝑣𝐴,∗(1 − 𝑥𝑗,𝑣𝐷 )) . (1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐴,∗(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷 )) ; ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (36) 
 
Set 𝛥𝑀 contains the  decision variables for the master problem including the auxiliary 
variable 𝜂 that gradually construct the cost function (23), the defender optimization variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷 , 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷 , 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐷 , 𝑣𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷 ,𝑤𝑔,𝑣𝐷  and the optimization variables for the operator 𝑃𝑔,𝑣𝐺 , 𝑃𝑖𝑣𝑆ℎ, 𝜃𝑖,𝑣, 𝐹𝑖𝑗,𝑣. 
Each iteration of the master problem is supplied by a set of parameters 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐴∗, 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐴∗ , 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐴∗   that 
are the optimal values of the attacker decisions obtained from the sub-problem. Note that 
the “ ∗ ” superscript denoted the variable is fixed to its optimum value obtained from the 
other problem. Since the defender should make the prioritized decision to optimize the cost 
function (23), the preemptive goal programming is employed to distinguish between the 
posturing strategy and the other defensive attempts. 
3.2 Preemptive Goal Programming Algorithm 
The defender has the interest to minimize the 𝑆𝑂𝐶 in addition to the investment cost for 
the equipment hardening/ reinforcement or false data propagation. Since an investor has a 
goal to protect the vital assets in the network with the hardening/reinforcement rather than 
posturing strategy, we employed the preemptive goal programming algorithm (PEPA) to 
make a difference among the real protection (hardening and reinforcement) and deception 
strategy. The basic purpose of goal programming is to simultaneously satisfy several goals 
relevant to the defender’s decision-making problem. PEPA deals with the achievement of 
prescribed different goals or targets among diverse objective terms [37]. The order of priority 
is defined based on the high-cost impact of each goal. For example, given the order of 
preference in order as to minimize (1) the system operating cost, (2) hardening resources, (3) 
the reinforcement resources, and (4) deception resources. The PEPA is a well know 
algorithmic method to solve multi-objective optimization problems when each objective term 
has a contradiction with other terms; like Hardening and deception terms. One can multiply 
different weighting factors at each term of objective functions and solve the optimization 
problem. Obviously, this method does not give us a global optimal solution for the given 
weighting factors. Indeed, each selection provides an individual solution, which can represent 
as a Pareto front. The defenders can also do the same and set the weights and then solve the 
optimization problem and finally make a decision based on the Pareto front. Therefore, one 
can ask (like defender), what is the global optimum solution when we have no idea about the 
weights of the objective terms? In this section, we tried to answer this question. Thanks to 
the preemptive goal programming algorithm (PEPA) method to answer this question. This 
method follows a cumulative method to add each objective term one by one as it is elaborated 
in (37) – (47). Steps for the PEPA is provided as Algorithm 1.  
 
 
Algorithm 1 The PEPA algorithm. (For a given iteration 𝑣) 
1: Step 1: Solve the master problem (23)-(36) with high prior objective function 𝑆𝑂𝐶, when min𝛥ℳ   𝜂1  (37) subject to:   𝜂1 ≥ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑣;  ∀𝑣  (38) 
(25)-(36)   
2: Step 2: If the first goal set is achieved, construct the new constraint (40) based on the achieved  
optimal solution of the problem in step 1, 𝜂1̂, and add it to the following problem. min𝛥ℳ   𝜂2 (39)         subject to:  
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𝜂1̂ + 𝜖1 ≥ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑣;  ∀𝑣 (40)  𝜂2 ≥ 𝜖1 + 𝐻𝑅𝑣;  ∀𝑣 (41) 
(25)-(36)  
3: Step 3: Generate additional new constraint the same as steps 1 and 2 for the rest of the 
objective function terms sequentially as follows:  min𝛥ℳ   𝜂3 (42) subject to:  𝜂2̂ + 𝜖2 ≥ 𝐻𝑅𝑣;  ∀𝑣 (43)  𝜂3 ≥ 𝜖1 + 𝜖2 + 𝑅𝑅𝑣;  ∀𝑣 (44) 
(25)- (36) & (40)   
Finally, for the last goal, the deception resources,   min𝛥ℳ   𝜂4 (45)         subject to:  𝜂3̂ + 𝜖3 ≥ 𝐷𝑅𝑣;  ∀𝑣 (46)         𝜂4 ≥ 𝜖1 + 𝜖2 + 𝜖3 + 𝐷𝑅𝑣;  ∀𝑣 (47) 
(25)- (36) & (40) & (43)  
4: Step 4: The final optimal value for the original objective function (23) in the PEPA is 𝜂 = 𝜂1̂ + 𝜂2̂ + 𝜂3̂ + 𝜂4̂ 
 
3.3 Sub-problem 
Sub-problem is a combination of the attacker and operator problems that has the bi-level 
max-min structure. The linearity and convexity of the lower-level problem in its decision 
variables enables us to apply the strong duality theorem and obtain a dual operator problem 
that is a maximization problem. Achieving the max-max structure promises a single-level 
maximization structure for the Sub-problem, which formulated in equations (48)-(57). Note 
that the dual objective function (48) is equivalent to (6). However, since the attacker does 
not have any control on 𝐻𝑅,𝐷𝑅, and 𝑅𝑅, their optimal value entered as the parameter from 
the master problem. 
max𝛥𝒮 [ ∑ 𝜇𝑔𝐺. (𝑃𝑔𝐺 + 𝑞𝑔𝑤𝑔𝐷∗). (𝑧𝑔𝐴 − 1)𝑔∈𝐺 − ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗. 𝑈𝑖𝑗. (1 +
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷∗𝐹𝑖𝑗 ) . (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 ) + (𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿  
∑𝑃𝑖𝐷. (𝜆𝑖𝐵 − 𝜇𝑖𝐷)𝑖 + 𝐻𝑅∗ + 𝑅𝑅∗ + 𝐷𝑅∗] 
 
 
 
(48) 
subject to  
𝑥𝑖𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑥𝑖𝐷𝑓∗;  ∀𝑖 (49) 
𝑧𝑔𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑧𝑔𝐷𝑓∗;  ∀𝑔  (50) 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴 ≤ 1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑓∗;  ∀(𝑖, 𝑗)  (51) 
∑𝑥𝑖𝐴𝑖∈𝐵 ≤ 𝑅𝐴𝐵; ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ≤ 𝑅
𝐴𝐿; ∑ 𝑧𝑔𝐴𝑔∈𝐺 ≤ 𝑅𝐴𝐺  (52) 
𝐶𝑔 − 𝜆𝑖(𝑔)𝐵 + 𝜇𝑔𝐺 = 0 ;  ∀𝑔  (53) 
𝐶𝑖𝑆ℎ − 𝜆𝑖(𝑑)𝐵 + 𝜇𝑖𝐷 ≥ 0;  ∀𝑖 (54) 
𝜆𝑖𝐵 − 𝜆𝑗𝐵 − 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝐹 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 − 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 = 0;   ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) (55) 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝐹 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑈𝑖𝑗 (1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷∗𝐹𝑖𝑗 )𝑗|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗
𝐹 𝐵𝑗𝑖𝑈𝑗𝑖 (1 + 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑣𝑗𝑖𝐷∗𝐹𝑖𝑗 )𝑗|(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝐿  ≥ 0;  ∀𝑖 (56) 
𝜇𝑖𝐷 ≥ 0,∀𝑖; 𝜇𝑔𝐺 ≥ 0, ∀𝑔 ; 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 , 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 ≥ 0;  ∀(𝑖, 𝑗)  (57) 
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where 𝛥𝒮 = {𝑥𝑖𝐴, 𝑧𝑔𝐴, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴, 𝜆𝑖𝐵, 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝐹 , 𝜇𝑔𝐺, 𝜇𝑖𝐷, 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 , 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 }. The dual cost function (48) is identical to 
the primal cost function (6). The attacker constraints (49)-(52) are equivalent to (13)-(16), 
while the defender’s strategies are that parameters entered from the master problem. 
Constraints (53)-(57) are the stationarity equations in dual problem, and (57) entails some 
dual variable to be non-negative. Note that dual variable 𝜆𝑖𝐵 in (53)-(55) adopts various 
subscripts 𝑖(𝑔), 𝑖(𝑑), 𝑖, 𝑗 which respectively stand for the bus that generator 𝑔 is located, the 
bus that load 𝑑  is located, the sending-end node of the ransmission line (𝑖, 𝑗), and the 
receiving-end node of transmission line (𝑖, 𝑗). 
3.4 Solution Algorithm for Bi-level Programming 
While the proposed sub-problem and the master problem has the non-linear formulation, 
they can be linearized according to the approaches explained in [34, 38]. Considering C&CG 
framework, lower-bound (LB)  and upper-bound (UB)  on the optimal value of objective 
function gradually constructs with the master problem and the sub-problem respectively. 
The optimal solution of the master problem at each iteration is entered as a parameter into 
sub-problem and vice versa. The iterative procedure lasts until the gap between the LB and UB is less than the predefined threshold 𝛿. The detailed steps of this iterative procedure are 
shown in Algorithm 2.  
 
Algorithm 2 The proposed bi-level programming algorithm 
 
1: Step 1 (Initialization): Set LB and UB bounds to −∞ and +∞, respectively. Set the iteration 
counter to 𝑣 = 0. Set the attacker’s variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐴∗, 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐴∗ , 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐴∗ = 0. 
2: Step 2: Update the iteration counter, 𝑣 ← 𝑣 + 1. Solve the master problem (23)-(36), using 
optimal values of attacker variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑣−1𝐴∗ , 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣−1𝐴∗ , 𝑧𝑔,𝑣−1𝐴∗   attained from Step 3 (or 
initialization) to be given parameter. In this step, the Algorithm 2 (PEPA algorithm) (37)-
(47) should be called to find the original multi-objective function (23) at iteration 𝑣, in 
order to obtain optimal solution value of variables 𝛥ℳ∗. Update LB as  LB = 𝜂∗. 
3: Step 3: Solve sub-problem (48)-(57) considering the optimal values of the defender’s variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑣𝐷∗, 𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷∗ , 𝑧𝑔,𝑣𝐷∗, 𝑣𝑖𝑗,𝑣𝐷∗ ,𝑤𝑔,𝑣𝐷∗  to be given parameters. Obtain the optimal solution of sub 
problem’s variables 𝛥𝒮∗. Update UB using  
UB = min {UB, [∑ 𝑃𝑖𝐷. (𝜆𝑖𝐵∗ − 𝜇𝑖𝐷∗)𝑖 + 𝐻𝑅∗ + ∑ 𝜇𝑔𝐺∗. (𝑃𝑔𝐺 + 𝑞𝑔𝑤𝑔𝐷∗). (𝑧𝑔𝐴∗ − 1)𝑔∈𝐺 + 𝑅𝑅∗ + 
𝐷𝑅∗ − ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑗. 𝑈𝑖𝑗∗ . (1 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷∗𝐹𝑖𝑗 ) . (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹
∗ + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝐹 ∗) (𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐿 ]} 
4: Step 4: If UB − LB is lower than a predefined tolerance 𝛿, terminate the algorithm and return 
the optimal solution in sets 𝛥𝒮∗ and 𝛥ℳ∗. Otherwise, continue in Step 2.  
4. Case Study 
The WSCC 9-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems are employed to demonstrate the 
performance of the proposed model. Note that the following considerations are made: 𝐶𝑖𝑆ℎ =1000, 𝐶𝑔 is equal to the marginal cost of the quadratic generation cost function, the maximum 
iteration is 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 50 and the tolerance error is set 𝛿 = 10−5. The algorithm is implemented 
and executed using PC with an Intel® Core™ i5 CPU running at 3.2 GHz and 8GB of RAM 
using CPLEX under GAMS. 
4.1 WSCC 9-bus system 
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The WSCC 9-bus system [39] with the load level of 315MW and optimum 𝑆𝑂𝐶 equal to 
$28.4 is employed in this section to perform the various analysis. Since the model is designed 
to help the defender, in the first study, the attacker is assumed has a full resource for the 
attack on all elements. Then, the model performance is evaluated when the defender has a 
different number of hardening resources. To this end, three actions are considered which 
could be utilized by the defender; 1) Hardening, 2) Hardening and Reinforcement, 3) 
Hardening, Reinforcement, and Deception. The case studies for the 9-bus system are defined 
based on these actions as follows: 
Case 01: Hardening Action: Hardening for 243 defender resource combinations; 243 different 
combination of defender resources (9 hardening resources for lines, 9 hardening resources for 
buses, 3 hardening resources for generators = 243) when the attacker has full resources 
(Figure 3). 
Case 02: Optimal Hardening Action: Optimal hardening combination or optimum defense 
strategy (one combination out of 243 combinations is optimum). This optimum defender 
strategy is visualized in Figure 4(a). In this optimal hardening action when an attacker 
attacks any component, the system still has the normal operation. 
Case 03: Hardening & Reinforcement Action: Figure 4(b) shows the optimum defense 
strategy with reinforcement action. It confirms that by increasing the capacity of generator 
G2 and its transformer at branch 2-8, the hardening is needed less equipment. 
Case 04: Hardening & Reinforcement & Deception Action: In this case, we have three types 
of defending recourses. It turns out the problem to a multi-objective optimization problem, 
where two solution methodologies are possible; I) with PEPA, and II) without PEPA. 
Case 04-I) with PEPA: In this method, we suppose that all resources are identical without 
any priority order to each other (Scenario 1 in Table 1). 
Case 04-II) with PEPA: The main intention to use PEPA approach is to prioritize the 
hardening to deception resources (Scenario 2 in Table 1, and Table 2). 
 Figure 3 shows how the 𝑆𝑂𝐶 changes with the different number of defender’s resources 
for protecting line, buses, and generators in a 9-bus system. Figure 3 consists of three parts; 
in the upper part, surfaces associated with 𝑅𝑃𝐺 = 1,2,3 are coincident, while in the lower 
part only the associated surfaces with 𝑅𝑃𝐺 = 2,3 are coincident. The upper part of Figure 3 
shows how the 𝑆𝑂𝐶 changes by changing defender’s resources for bus and line when only 
one generator G1, or G2, or G3 is protected. By increasing the defender’s resources to 𝑅𝑃𝐿 =2, 𝑅𝑃𝐵 = 3, and 𝑅𝑃𝐺 = 1 the model protects the highest load and cheapest generator by 
hardening generator {2}, buses {2, 8,9}, and lines {2-8,7-8}. 
The middle surface shows hardening only generator G1 can promise lower SOC than 
protecting single generator G2 or G3. As can be seen, increasing defender’s resources results 
in reducing 𝑆𝑂𝐶, however, when defender only protects one generator, cannot reduce 𝑆𝑂𝐶 
less than $45,033.1 ($33.1 generation cost plus $45,000 load shed cost), where buses 
{3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, and lines {3-6,4-5,4-9,5-6,6-7,7-8,8-9}, and generator {3} are hardened. The 
bottom surface shows the defender’s strategies to omit load shed and promise minimum 
generation cost that can be achieved by protecting generators G2 and G3.  The minimum 
element to be protected to achieve this goal is shown in Figure 4(a) where red components 
indicate the protected one. While reinforcement resources are not considered in the above-
mentioned analysis, the effect of improving the capacity of lines and generator is shown in 
Figure 4(b), where defender adds 15MW to generator {2}, and 100MW to line {2-8}. By 
doing so, not only does the cost of operation reduces from $28.4 to $26.8, but fewer elements 
should be protected against attack. Both Figures 4(a) and 4(b) utilize the same formulation, 
namely (2)-(22), but the difference is the resources for capacity increment for the line (𝑅𝑅𝐿) 
and generator (𝑅𝑅𝐺) which are considered zero in the left system (Figure 4 (a)). The reason 
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why the PEPA approach is utilized in this paper is to prioritize the hardening to the 
deception. Since there are no deception resources in this case study, the solution can be 
obtained without using the PERA approach. 
 
 
Figure 3. 𝑆𝑂𝐶  in different scenarios when 𝑅𝑃𝐺 = 1,2,3. 
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Figure 4. 9-bus system: (a) optimum defender’s strategy without reinforcement. (b) Optimum 
defender’s strategy with reinforcement of generator 2 and line 2-8. 
 
Prioritizing resource allocation is essential for the defender who pursues the posturing 
strategy. Table 1 analyses the performance of the proposed model when the model solved 
without PEPA approach (scenario 1), and when the PEPA method is utilized (scenario 2). 
In both cases, the defender resources are 𝑅𝑃𝐵 = 4, 𝑅𝑃𝐿 = 2, 𝑅𝑃𝐺 = 1, 𝑅𝐹𝐵 = 2, 𝑅𝐹𝐿 = 2, 𝑅𝐹𝐺 = 1, 𝑅𝑅𝐿 = 100, 𝑅𝑅𝐺 = 100, while the aggressor has the full resource for the intrusion. 
In both scenarios, the defender decides to protect six buses, five lines, and one generator and 
the SOC will reach to the minimum possible value of $26.8. However, the defender does not 
have any preference to assign the deception to the part with the lower-importance in the first 
scenario, while in the second scenario, the defender allocates the hardening resources to the 
higher-priority equipment. Consequently, if the deception strategy leaked out and the invader 
attack to the not-hardened components, the damage imposed to the system in scenario 2 is 
much lower than scenario 1, as indicated in the column entitled “SOC if Attack”. The last 
column in Table 1,” SOC No Deception”, represents the SOC if no resources for deception 
strategy is available. Since both scenarios utilize the same number of resources for hardening, 
the SOC is the same in both cases. It can be seen that SOC increases if no deception applied, 
where the defender defends buses 2,8, 9, lines 8-2 and 8-9, and generator G2, and the attacker 
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attacks to other components. As can be seen, if no deception resources being available and 
the attacker intrudes the system, the SOC will increase by 52% and 117% for scenario one 
and two respectively.  
 
Table 1 Comparison between the solution with and without PEPA approach when attacker has full resources for attack. 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑥𝑖𝐷 𝑧𝑔𝐷 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷 𝑥𝑖𝑓  𝑧𝑔𝑓  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓  𝑤𝑔𝐷       𝑣𝑖𝑗𝐷 𝑆𝑂𝐶   𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑆𝑂𝐶   𝑁𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
1 {2,5,7,8} {2} {4-5} {4,9} -- 
{7-8,8-2, 
8-9,9-4} 
{2:15MW} 
{8-2: 
70MW} 
$125,023 $190,011 
2 {2,7,8,9} {2} {4-5, 8-2, 
 8-9, 9-4} 
{4,5} -- {7-8} {2:100MW} {8-2: 
100MW} 
$90,022 $190,011 
 
Table 2 Defender strategies when attacker has two resources for attacking to the buses, lines, and generators.  
𝑅𝑃𝐵 𝑅𝑃𝐺 𝑅𝑃𝐿 𝑅𝐹𝐵 𝑅𝐹𝐺 𝑅𝐹𝐿 𝑥𝑖𝐷 𝑧𝑔𝐷 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷 𝑥𝑖𝑓  𝑧𝑔𝑓  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓  𝑥𝑖𝐴 𝑧𝑔𝐴 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴 LS (MW) LSA (MW) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,3 1,3 6-7,8-2 315 315 
1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 8-9 -- -- -- 1,3 1,3 7-8,8-2 315 315 
0 0 0 1 1 1 -- -- -- 2 2 8-9 1,3 1,3 7-8,8-2 315 315 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 8-9 9 -- 2-8 3 3 4-5,7-8 190 315 
4 2 4 0 0 0 2,7,8,9 2 7-8,2-8,8-9 -- -- -- 1,3 1,3 4-5,6-7 90 90 
2 1 2 2 1 2 2,9 2 2-8,8-9 8,7 -- 8-7 1,3 1,3 4-5,7-8 90 190 
6 2 6 0 0 0 2,4,5,7 
,8,9 
2 4-5,7-8,2-8, 
8-9,4-9 
-- -- -- 1,3 1,3 5-6,6-7 0 0 
3 1 3 3 1 3 2,8,9 2 2-8,8-9,7-8 4,5
,7 
-- 4-5 
4-9 1,3 2,3 4-5,6-7 0 90 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the defender's strategies given the various numbers of defensive 
resources, and when the attacker resources are 𝑅𝐴𝐵 = 2,𝑅𝐴𝐺 = 2, 𝑅𝐴𝐿 = 2. The LS and LSA 
in the last two columns stand for the maximum load shed that respectively the deceived 
attacker and not-deceived attacker can impose to the network. The first row displays that if 
the network is defenseless, the attacker with only two resources for buses, lines, and 
generators can interrupt supplying the loads and cause 315 MW load shed. Even if the 
defender has one resource for protection grid’s elements, he cannot prevent the full load shed 
within the system. Comparing the second and the third row conveys the fact that the 
defender protects the combination of bus 2, generator 2, and line 8-9 if he either has one set 
of hardening or deception resources for protecting the grid’s elements. When the defender 
equipped with one set of resources for both hardening and deception, he can reduce the load 
shod to the 190 MW by deceiving the attacker. However, if the deception strategies leaked 
and the aggressor attacks to the bus 9 and line 2-8, he can cause the load shed of 315 MW.  
The load shed is reduced to 90 MW when the defender has 4 resources for buses and 
lines, and two resources for generators. The defended elements are prioritized when the 
resources in the case mentioned previously are divided into hardening and deception resources. 
In this case, since the resources are enough for protecting the two loads, buses 2 and 9, lines 
2-8 and 8-9, and generator 2 are hardened to ensure that the largest load (125MW) is 
protected, and buses 7 and 8 and line 7-8 are postured to be protected to save the 100MW 
load from the attack. Accordingly, in the case of deception failure, the damage would be 
minimized. There is no load shed in the system if the defender hardens 6 buses, 1 generator, 
and 5 lines, and the load shed slightly increases when the protecting resources are divided to 
hardening and deception in the last row, that implies the importance of using the PEPA 
approach in allocating the resources. This table also shows that generator 9, buses 2 and 9, 
and line 8-9 are among the top of hardening, while the buses 1 and 3 are mostly attacked. 
This counter-intuitive result helps the system planner to recognize the critical assets and 
make the judicious strategic planning for his network. 
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Our hardening and deception strategy are compared with the method proposed in [29], 
which utilized a Markov game model based on pre-defined five states with probabilities of 
defending and attacking to the lines. One of the five states is the “static state” without 
Markov model and probability, which our deterministic approach can be compared with.  
Since [29] only handles one attack and defend to the transmission lines at a time, we consider 𝑅𝑃𝐿 = 𝑅𝐴𝐿 = 1 to make the assessment. The comparison is shown in Figure 5 for three 
scenarios provided in [29] with static nature. The left part is identical to the result in [29], 
and the right part is calculated based on our proposed approach. 
 In Case I, line 2-4 is down and the approach proposed in [29] concludes that defender 
should defend line 2-8 and 1-4 with the probability of 81% and 19% respectively, and lines 
2-8 and 5-6 are prone to attack with the chance of 32% and 38% respectively. In this case, 
in all four possible scenarios, there is no load shed in the system. However, our approach 
recognizes line 3-6 and 8-9 as the vulnerable component that has to be defended, otherwise 
damaging these lines cause 65MW load shed in the system. Since the outcome of the model 
should give an insight to the defender to recognize the components that are crucial for defense, 
our approach has privilege to the [29] due to recognizing lines 3-6 and 8-9 as a potential cause 
of 65MW load shed in the system, hence it brings the load saving of 65MW to the system.  
In case II, lines 2-8 and 1-4 are recognized as the vulnerable component that their failure 
cause 65MW load shoed, however, our approach introduces lines 7-8 and 4-5 as the potential 
attacker target that can bring on 100 and 90 MW of load shed respectively. In this case, our 
approach promises at least 25MW load saving for the system should the attack succeed. 
While repairing line 1-4 in case III is an appropriate defending strategy adopted by [29], their 
method failed to recognize line 8-9 as a potential cause of 165 MW load shed in the system. 
While our deterministic approach is compared with the probabilistic method in [29], in overall, 
it can be seen that our proposed approach recognizes the more vulnerable lines that can 
provoke more amount of load shed in the system and adopts strategies that result in more 
load saving for the system in case of a successful intrusion. In most cases, the vulnerable 
components have not recognized with any chance as the vulnerable component in [29]. 
Our hardening approach for transmission lines has a similar result with [10]. However, 
both [10] and [29] only consider the transmission line as the target of attack and defend. As 
a more comprehensive model in comparison to [10], we further consider attacking the buses 
and generators, in addition to the fortification of transmission lines and generator units. 
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Figure 5.  Comparison between the hardening methods proposed in [29] and our approach. The left 
part is based on [29], and the right part is based on our approach. 
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The deception strategy proposed in [29] assumes that the attacker will use a deceiving 
cost function to evaluate the cost of the load shed in the system, and their deception approach 
could gain the defender up to 50% of load shed reduction. In comparison the deception 
strategy proposed by [29], our approach has a more promising performance; we consider 
deception strategy not only for lines but for buses and generators; we exactly determine the 
component that should receive deception strategy based on the number of available deception 
resources. Table 3 demonstrates simple cases to show deception performance. In the first case, 
line 8-9 is down and the attacker with one resource attack to line 9-4 and cause 125MW load 
shed. Once the defender gets one deception resource, he defends line 9-4, and attacker damage 
declines by 48% to 65 MW. In Case 2, the deception resource can prevent any load shed in 
the system, gaining the defender 100% of load shed reduction. 
  
Table 3 Deception performance  
Case Line Outage 𝑅𝑃𝐿 𝑅𝐹𝐿 𝑅𝐴𝐿 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐷 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝐴 LS(MW) 
Case 1 
8-9 0 0 1 -- -- 9-4 125 
8-9 0 1 1 -- 9-4 1-4 65 
Case 2 
4-5 0 0 1 -- -- 5-6 90 
4-5 0 1 1 -- 5-6 2-8 0 
4.2 IEEE 118-bus system 
In this section, the proposed model is applied to the IEEE 118-bus system [39] with the 
load level of 4242 MW and optimum 𝑆𝑂𝐶 of $59.1. Note that 𝐹𝑖𝑗, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) are considered as 
150 MW. The studies are performed to demonstrate the sensitivity of 𝑆𝑂𝐶 to the defender’s 
resources for protecting buses, generators and lines, considering the different amount of 
defender’s resources for false information (posturing) in each case. Note that to obtain 
sensitivity analysis for one facility, for example, buses, the defender has ample resources for 
protecting the other facilities, e.g., lines and generators. Moreover, the attacker has full 
resources to attack all elements. 
Figures 6 shows the sensitivity of the 𝑆𝑂𝐶 to the number of protected buses (𝑅𝑃𝐵), 
number of protected lines (𝑅𝑃𝐿), and number of protected generators (𝑅𝑃𝐺). It also compares 
these sensitivities to the different number of false data (posturing) in each case. For example, 
Figures 6(a) shows how the 𝑆𝑂𝐶  decreases when defender increases 𝑅𝑃𝐵 (false data for 
protecting buses). Comparing blue and red lines show how the 𝑆𝑂𝐶 decreases when the 
defender sends out 5 false data in protecting buses, and how 𝑆𝑂𝐶 decreases further when 𝑅𝐹𝐵 = 10, as represented by the green line. The difference between 𝑆𝑂𝐶 for the blue line (𝑅𝐹𝐵 = 0) and the red line (𝑅𝐹𝐵 = 5) is represented by 𝛥𝑍0−5, which is the point-to-point 
difference in monetary gain that five more false data can bring to the system. Likewise, 𝛥𝑍5−10 is the point-to-point difference between the red and the green lines. It shows how 
much more saving can be achieved by increasing five more false data in addition to the 
hardening resources. The  𝛥𝑍0−5  and 𝛥𝑍5−10  can be viewed as the monetary worth of 
posturing or “value of posturing”, i.e., the benefit that deception tactic brings to the system. 
Figures 7 to 9 shows how adding more false data can bring more savings to the system. 
As can be seen, 𝛥𝑍0−5  is more effective than the 𝛥𝑍5−10  in most cases, meaning that 
“overdoing it” may not be beneficial in cost-saving. Moreover, the distribution of the 𝛥𝑍0−5 and 𝛥𝑍5−10 over 𝑅𝑃𝐵, 𝑅𝑃𝐿, and 𝑅𝑃𝐺 gives an idea to the planner to how get the 
maximum benefits from posturing. For example, the maximum cost saving is achieved when 
defender utilized 5 more posturing resources while using 2 resources for hardening the buses 
( 𝛥𝑍0−5  at 𝑅𝐹𝐵 = 2 ). The value of posturing for generators is depicted in Figure 7. 
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Surprisingly, the vast amount of posturing cannot reduce the objective function cost as a 
limited amount does. This figure shows a saving cost around to $2.5 million by applying only 
five deceptive resources, which is a considerable saving. 
According to Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (b), while increasing the defender resources for 
hardening the facilities result in decreasing effect of the terrorist attack, the trend of this 
decrement is different in each facility. This fact speaks for the need for a comprehensive 
model, as we propose, to balance the deployment of different elements. More importantly, 
the value of posturing, as indicated in Figure 7 to Figure 9, implies different behavior 
considering the defender’s resources for protection. For example, Figure 8 shows that the 
defender can get the highest benefit from posturing when he protects two buses and releases 
false information for 5 buses. As can be seen in Figure 6, there is a point that increasing 
number of defender resources for protecting buses, transmission lines, and generators does 
not lead to decreasing objective function more than $59.1 (optimal 𝑆𝑂𝐶 in normal condition). 
These points are 𝑅𝑃𝐵 = 97, 𝑅𝑃𝐿 = 89, 𝑅𝑃𝐺 = 38. We have named this protection plan as the 
optimum defend strategy, where the system immune against any attack. This protection 
scheme is shown in Figure 11 (red elements are protected), which is obtained by running the 
model considering the above-mentioned defender’s resources.  
Figure 10 demonstrates the 𝑆𝑂𝐶 and computational time in the IEEE 118-bus system, 
considering different values for 𝑅𝑃𝐵  and 𝑅𝑃𝐺 , when the defender has full resources for 
protecting lines and the attacker has full resources for attacking all elements. Note that the 
tolerated relative optimality gap is set to 5%. Generally, it is shown that the problem is 
computationally tractable (the maximum running time is 1367 sec), and the running time is 
increased when 𝑅𝑃𝐵 increase. Moreover, it is exposed that some combination of 𝑅𝑃𝐵 and 𝑅𝑃𝐺 need more computational burden. 
 
Figure 6.  The sensitivity of 𝑺𝑶𝑪 to defender resources for components hardening. 
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Figure 7.  Value of posturing for protecting generators. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Value of posturing for protecting buses. 
 
Figure 9.  Value of posturing for protecting transmission lines. 
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Time(s)  
Figure 10.  Computational time and 𝑺𝑶𝑪 with the different value of 𝑹𝑷𝑮 and 𝑹𝑷𝑩 
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Figure 11.  Optimum defend strategy in IEEE 118-bus test system. Red elements indicate protected one. 
5. Conclusion 
A multi-objective tri-level defender-attacker-operator problem to assist power system 
planner against deliberate attack is proposed in this paper. Attackers and defender can make 
protection and attack strategy on buses, transmission lines, and generators. Also, the defender 
has a choice to improve the transmission line and generator capacity as his defense strategy. 
Moreover, the defender can make a deception strategy rather than real protection (hardening) 
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and deceive the attacker about the protection status of an element by posturing. A 
distinguishing feature of our model is our explicit recognition of the important information 
plays in such a competitive game, as shown in our discussions on shared cognition and 
epistemic knowledge, defined as knowledge supporting a belief, truth or hypothesis. 
The tri-level problem is decomposed into a single-level defender-operator master problem 
and a bi-level attacker-operator sub-problem. Subsequently, the duality theorem utilized to 
transform the bi-level sub-problem to the single level one. The constraint-and-column 
generation technique is then employed to solve the problem, and the pre-emptive goal 
programming approach provides the defender with an option to protect the most critical 
facilities by the hardening strategy and applies the posturing tactic on the lower-priority 
parts. While the model is generally computationally tractable, the comprehensive case study 
shows the model has different behaviors in different cases, concerning computation burden 
and defender’s strategy, highly dependent on the defender’s resources for reinforcement, 
deception, and hardening. By performing various sensitivity analyses, also we reached the 
optimum defend strategy, which is a protection status of the power network that immunes 
the power system against any attack.  
The monetary worth of deception is also calculated, that shows how much benefits 
deception strategy brings to the system with different protection status. It is shown that this 
amount is different in various strategies and the defender would be assisted by the model to 
make the best decision. 
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